










Does the World Bank have a micro‐macro 
paradox or do the data deceive? 
Stephen Howes, Sabit Otor and Cate Rogers 
Abstract 
In  1986, Mosely first  drew attention  to an  apparent  paradox in the performance  of 
international aid. Microeconomic data from evaluations of aid financed projects showed 
a majority of projects were successful, whereas macroeconomic data from regressions 
of aid on growth were discouraging. The paradox, if real, implied that the aggregate 
impact of aid was less the sum of its parts. Mosely asked whether the paradox was real 
of whether the “data deceived.” This question, which has come to be equated with the 
issue of whether aid works, has been the subject of numerous cross‐country regressions 
to test whether aid has an impact on growth (or related variables). But the regression 
results have been inconclusive, and the methodology has come under attack. Evidence 
from case studies offers an alternative test. One prominent case study approach is that 
of  Picciotto  (2009),  which  claims  to  find  strong  evidence  for  the  existence  of  the 
paradox,  namely  the  fact  that  one  third  of World  Bank  country  assistance  program 
evaluations show success at the project (micro) level but not at the country (macro) 
level. This paper re‐evaluates Piciotto’s claimed findings. Only about one‐third of the 
disconnects survive critical scrutiny, and the source of these remaining disconnects has 
nothing to do with negative effects of aggregate aid. Although in the Picciotto case, the 
data do indeed deceive, we conclude that country‐level aid studies are nevertheless a 
useful  tool  for  donors  to  use  to  guard  against  possible,  albeit  uncertain,  negative 
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Does the World Bank have a micro-macro paradox or do the data deceive? 
1. Introduction 
In  1986  Mosley  drew  attention  to  an  apparent  paradox  in  the  performance  of 
international  aid.    Microeconomic  data  from  evaluations  of  aid  financed  projects 
showed  a  majority  of  projects  were  successful,  whereas  macroeconomic  data  from 
regressions of aid on growth were discouraging (Mosely 1986, p.22). Mosley posed the 
following questions: 
“What is going on?  Is it true as the data suggest that aid projects are succeeding 
while aid as a whole is failing, if so how?  Or do the data in fact deceive?” (1986, 
p.22) 
The existence of a micro-macro paradox has come to be largely synonymous with the 
question  of  whether  aid  is  effective.  If  there  was  strong  evidence  for  it,  it  would 
markedly weaken the case for aid, and it would also force donors to invest much more 
in a search for ways to preserve micro-level success while weakening adverse macro-
level consequences. There is in fact probably no more important question in the field of 
aid than whether the micro-macro paradox of aid actually exists.  
Various reasons have been put forward for the existence of a macro-micro paradox. 
These include: 
  The possibility of fungibility. If aid projects succeed, but would have occurred 
even without aid funding, then the aggregate impact of aid could be less than the 
aggregate impact of the projects, if the actual use to which the aid funding is put 
is of less value.  
  The possibility of exchange rate appreciation. To the extent that aid is used to 
purchase non-traded goods, it will put upward pressure on the real exchange 
rate, with possibly negative growth impacts. 
  The  possibility  of  institutional  deterioration.  Aid  may  lead  to  an  ‘aid  curse’ 
similar  to  the  ‘resource  curse’.  Societies  might  consume  resources  trying  to 




extreme  cases,  the  prospect  of  aid  can  lead  to  corrupt  and  even  violent 
behaviour. It can also reduce the expectation of citizens from their government, 
and then reduce the demand for good governance. 
  The  possibility  of  high  transaction  costs.  The  cumulative  impact  of  a  large 
number of aid projects might weaken government. It might distract civil servants 
from their own duties, it might make budgeting and planning difficult (especially 
if aid is volatile and/or unpredictable), and it might lead to a brain-drain from 
the  civil  service  to  the  better-paying  donor  community,  all  with  negative 
consequences for economic management and performance. 
All of these are possible and plausible pathways by which, regardless of success at the 
project level, aggregate aid would negatively impact on development. The essence of the 
micro-macro paradox is that the aggregate impact of aid is less than the sum of its parts. 
The aggregate impact of aid – taking into account both the impact of aggregate aid, and 
the combined impact of individual projects - might still be positive, but might also be 
very small or even negative, depending on the relative contribution of each. 
Given  the  importance of  the  paradox,  and  the  prima  facie  plausibility of  the  causal 
mechanisms which would give rise to it, it is not surprising that the search for the 
micro-macro paradox has been the source of major research programs. Most of this 
research has been in the nature of cross-country regressions. However, as summarized 
in the next section, this literature has disappointed, and left few if any firm results in its 
wake.  
An alternative approach would be to use case-studies. This approach was used in 2009 
by Robert Picciotto, former head of the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group. In 
his  paper  titled  “Development  Effectiveness:  An  Evaluation  Perspective”,  Picciotto 
argues that the case-study evidence points to the existence of a significant micro-macro 
paradox in World Bank aid: in sixteen1 of the 55 country-level evaluations that had been 
carried out, aid is rated a success at the project (micro) level, but not at the country 
(macro) level and in three it is considered a success at the country level despite being 
unsatisfactory at  the project  level. Picciotto’s claim “that  a full fledged micro-macro 
                                                 
1 At one point, Picciotto says there are fifteen such cases (p. 198) but his count of sixteen in the previous 




paradox  was  found  to  prevail  in  one-third  of  the  cases”  (2009,  p.198)  the  Bank 
evaluated is an important one, and is the central focus of this paper. First, however, we 
consider  the  cross-country  aid-growth  regression  literature,  as  it  is  disappointment 
with this literature which has given rise to the need to pursue a case-study approach of 
the type Picciotto deploys.   
2. Cross-Country Regressions 
Mosely (1986) used data from 1961-1981 to perform a series of regressions of aid on 
growth. He found that when other determinants of growth such as savings rates and 
export growth were held constant he could not confirm for any continent a significant 
and positive relationship of aid on  growth despite positive micro-level results from 
World Bank projects. 
Post-Mosely, the idea that projects on average work has been little contested.  Cassen 
and associates (1986, 1994, cited in Doucouliagos & Paldam 2009, p. 438) finds that 
about 50 per cent of all development projects work and that very few of the remaining 
projects cause harm even if they fail. Aggregating these results leads to a modest case 
for aid working. Riddell in his 2007 book on aid concludes that ‘The available evidence 
suggests, quite  strongly, that  the clear majority of official aid projects achieve their 
immediate objectives.’ (pp. 192-3) 
But  whether  aid  works  at  the  macro  level  has  been  much  contested.  A  massive 
literature built on cross-country growth-aid regressions has been developed. In their 
survey, Doucouliagos and Paldam count some 97 papers to the end of 2004 (2009, 
p.435).  
There are various surveys of this literature. McGillivray et al (2005) conclude that post 
1998 there seems to be agreement that aid works, to the extent that in its absence 
growth  would  be  lower.      Doucouliagos  and  Paldam  (2009),  however,  reach  the 
opposite  conclusion.  They  conclude  that  “After  40  years  of  development  aid,  the 
preponderance of the evidence indicates that aid has not  been  effective.” (Abstract) 
Recently Mekasha and Tarp (2011) have re-done the Doucouliagos and Paldam meta-
analysis and reached the opposite conclusion, namely that aid does promote growth. 




Subramaniam  (2008)  is  the  most  well-known,  recent  study  which  concurs  with 
Mosely’s much earlier finding of no link between aid and growth. Several other studies 
find a link only between certain types of aid and growth.  
The limitations of the cross-country literature extend beyond its inconclusive nature. 
First,  the  cross-country  growth  regression  literature,  within  which  the  aid-growth 
literature is situated, is itself indecisive, and controversial. It is not only aid where the 
profession  has  struggled  to  find  a  robust  linkage  with  growth.  Easterly  (2009) 
concludes that “we have failed to identify” (p. 122) any variables which provide a robust 
explanation of growth across countries. According to him, “We have learnt something 
from the failure of growth regressions: that there is no universal factor X that works 
everywhere to reliability raise growth.” (p. 129).2 The utility of growth regressions is 
disputed.  Angus  Deaton  writes  that  “the  econometric  studies  that  use  international 
evidence to examine aid effectiveness currently have low professional status.” (Deaton 
2009, p.2)  
Second, while it is unclear whether more aid leads to more growth, it is clear that more 
growth  leads  to  less  aid  (Roodman  2008,  p.7),  as  donors  come  to  perceive  the 
successfully-growing recipient as being less and less in need of aid. To analyze the 
impact of aid on growth in the presence of this this reverse causality, the relationship 
between aid and growth has to be studied using ‘instruments’ for aid, that is, variables 
which are thought to be correlated with aid, but only with growth through their effect 
on aid. But it is unclear which variables should be used as instruments and different 
choices will lead to different results (Roodman, 2008, p.10). This leads Roodman to 
conclude that “there appear to be almost no findings in the contemporary literature that 
a)  find  a  significant  effect  of  aid  on  growth,  b)  are  robust  and  c)  are  free  of 
methodological problems…” (Roodman, 2008, p.17).  
Despite these difficulties, the cross-country aid-growth regression literature continues 
to thrive. One growing strand of this literature is to test directly for a micro-macro 
paradox by examining directly whether aid generates paradoxical outcomes, such as 
                                                 
2 Less dramatically, Durlauf et al in their Handbook survey of cross-country growth regressions conclude 
with reference to the “significant limitations of the existing evidence and the tools that are currently 




higher corruption, or higher exchange rates. However, these sub-strands suffer from the 
same deficiencies as the broader aid-growth literature. They deliver conflicting results, 
their methodology can be attacked, and they require the use of instrumental variables 
for aid. To illustrate, Knack (1999) and Djankov et al (2008) conclude on the basis of 
regression  analysis  that  aid  weakens  institutions.  But  Ear  (2007)  critiques  Knack 
(1999) and argues that “the causal link between aid dependence and worsening quality 
of  governance  may  be  tenuous  at  best  and  sensitive  to  alternative  specifications.” 
(Abstract). 
Yet another approach has been to use cross-country regressions at the sectoral level, for 
example to look for a link between sectoral (or total) aid and sectoral outcomes. For 
example, Dreher, Nunnenkamp,  and Theile (2006) estimate a  series of equations in 
which  public  expenditure,  education  outcomes  and  institutional  quality  are  jointly 
determined.  Their results show aid significantly increases primary school enrolment 
(Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Theile 2006, p.20). Mishra and Newhouse (2007) find that 
health aid has a significant positive effect on reducing infant mortality (p.6).  There are 
too few studies of this kind to draw overall conclusions at this stage.  It may be that they 
also turn out to be fragile. Moreover, they do not rule out the macro-micro paradox. It 
could be that aid improves health and education indicators, but slows growth. 
3. Case Studies and Picciotto’s Approach 
Given  the growing recognition  of the short-comings of the cross-country regression 
approach, increasing use is being made of case studies. This is true not only for aid, but 
for  understanding  growth  and  development  more  generally.  Darlauf  et  al,  in  their 
survey  of  growth  econometrics  in  the  Handbook  of  Economic  Growth  (2005,  p.561) 
write “We would also argue that an important contribution of growth econometrics has 
been the clarification of the limits that exist in employing statistical methods to address 
growth  questions.  One  implication  of  these  limits  is  that  narrative  and  historical 
approaches … have a lasting role to play in empirical growth analysis.”  
There are a growing, though still small, number of individual case-studies examining 
the  country-level  impact  of  aid.  Arndt,  Jones  and  Tarp’s  (2007)  study  of  aid  to 




of growth. They find that aid has played a ‘determinant’ role in growth and poverty 
reduction since 1992. In their view aid played a critical role in building infrastructure 
and expanding access to health and education.  On the negative side, they found that aid 
had generated important governance and economic management challenges – raising 
questions about the sustainability of its impact (Arndt, Jones & Tarp 2007, p.79) Moss, 
Pettersson and van de Walle (2008) conclude from their qualitative review of Africa 
that “a large and sustained volume of aid can have negative effects on the development 
of  public  good  institutions  in  low-income  countries.”  (p.  274)  though  the  authors 
themselves concede that this is only a “tentative claim.”  
Picciotto (2009) examines the extent of the disconnect between performance ratings 
provided  in  Country  Assistance  Evaluations  (CAEs)  produced  by  the  World  Bank’s 
Independent  Evaluation  Group  (IEG).  He  examines  55  CAEs  and  finds  that  a  “fully 
fledged micro-macro paradox was found to prevail in a third of the cases.” (Picciotto 
2009, p.198) 
Table 1 below reproduces Picciotto’s Box 8.2. The year next to the country name refers 
to the year of the CAE. Years in brackets refer to a specific sub-period of time within the 
overall  timeframe  of  the  CAE,  for  which  separate  program-level  evaluations  are 
provided by some CAEs. Hence Mexico 2001 appears three times in the satisfactory 
column, with different years rated separately.  This is typically done when the period 
covers  a  crisis:  Russia  in  1998  or  Mexico  in  2001-2.  Finally,  the  large  number  of 
asterisks alongside country strategies indicates that either or both of the country and 
aggregate  project  ratings  were  considered  to  be  either  moderately  (or  marginally) 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory.      
The IEG started producing CAEs in 1995. Just as IEG project-level evaluations rate all 
Bank projects at their closure as highly or moderately satisfactory or unsatisfactory, 
CAEs apply the same rating scheme to country assistance strategies (CASs), which are 
the strategies produced by the Bank to guide its assistance to each recipient country, 
typically for a period of about four years (World Bank 2009, ES).  Box 1 summarises the 
IEG approach to country assistance evaluations. Picciotto uses the CAS performance 




The IEG also undertakes a number of other country-level ratings, including an aggregate 
project  rating.  This  is  used  by  Picciotto  to  judge  the  micro  impact  of  aid,  that  is, 
whether, on average, Bank-funded projects work. It is not clear from IEG documentation 
how this aggregate project rating is arrived at. From our examination of the CAEs it 
appears to be most commonly the case that a satisfactory rating is given if 50% or more 
of projects which close in the period being covered are rated satisfactory by the IEG in 
the  course  of  their  project-level  evaluations.  (The  IEG  rates  each  completed  Bank 
project.) 3 
  
   
                                                 
3 For some but not all CAEs an aggregate project outcome rating is provided. For others there was no 
overall evaluation, but data included showing the results of IEG project evaluations.  For one CAE, 
Ukraine, there was no information on IEG project evaluation ratings. Based on Picciotto (2009), which 
provides an aggregate project rating for each CAE, sourced to the IEG, it appears that even where the CAE 




Table 1: Country Assistance and project portfolio outcome ratings 
Country assistance strategy 



















































Dominican Republic 2003* 
Egypt 2000* 










Mexico 2001 (1989-91)* 
Mexico 2001 (1995-96)* 
Mexico 2001 (1997-2000)* 
Mongolia 2002* 
Peru 2003 
Rwanda 2004 (1995-2001)* 
















































Rwanda 2004 (1990-94)* 
Guatemala 2002 
Papua New Guinea 2000 
Cameroon 2000 
4 CASs 





Box 1 Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE): performance ratings 
The rating scale for CAS performance is given below. Note that this is known as the 
rating  for  CAS  ‘outcomes.’  Separate  ratings  are  given  at  the  country  level  for 
sustainability and institutional impact as well.  
Ratings Scale: 
Highly  Satisfactory:  the  assistance  program  achieved  at  least  acceptable  progress 
towards all major relevant objectives, and had best practice development impact on one 
or more of them.  No major shortcomings (such as safeguard violations) were identified. 
Satisfactory:  the  assistance  program  achieved  acceptable  progress  toward  all  major 
relevant  objectives.  No  best  practice  achievements  or  major  shortcomings  were 
identified. 
Moderately Satisfactory: The assistance program achieved acceptable progress toward 
most of its major relevant objectives. No major shortcomings were identified. 
Moderately Unsatisfactory: The assistance program did not make acceptable progress 
toward most of its major relevant objectives, or made acceptable progress on all of 
them but (a) did not take into account a key development constraint or (b) produced a 
major shortcoming, such as a safeguard violation. 
Unsatisfactory: The assistance program did not make acceptable progress toward most 
of its major relevant objectives, and either (a) did not take into adequate account a key 
development constraint and (b) produced a major shortcoming, such as a safeguard 
violation. 
Highly  unsatisfactory:  The  assistance  program  did  not  make  acceptable  progress 
toward any of its major relevant objectives and did not take adequate account a key 
development constraint while also producing at least one major shortcoming, such as a 
safeguard violation. 




As is evident from Table 1, there is a positive association between the ratings ascribed 
to project results and country assistance outcomes in 36 instances, and a disconnect in 
one third, or 19 of the 55 cases.  In sixteen of these, project portfolio performance is 
rated satisfactory, but country strategy performance unsatisfactory –  that is, there is a 
paradox – and in the other three it is the other way round  – we call these ‘reverse 
paradox’ countries. 
The Picciotto approach is certainly innovative and important, but it suffers from two 
shortcomings. First, Picciotto accepts the IEG findings at face value. He does not apply 
any independent scrutiny. Second, he at no stage asks whether any of the typical causal 
mechanisms behind a paradox – the ones we listed earlier, and which he also lists – can 
explain the disconnects that he finds.  
In  what  follows  we  address  these  failings  by  independently  scrutinizing  the  IEG 
findings, and by examining the reasons for those for which, even  after independent 
scrutiny, there is a disconnect. We do this for both groups of disconnect countries: both 
paradox and reverse-paradox countries. 
4. Scrutiny of IEG ratings 
A qualitative review was undertaken of the 19 cases identified by Picciotto as being 
instances  where  the  micro-macro  paradox  was  evident.  The  CAE  reports  were 
examined primarily to determine whether the ratings applied to portfolio performance 
were justified. CAS performance ratings require more judgment, and so are harder to 
scrutinize, but we checked that the rating was consistent with the IEG methodology 
(Box 1). 
There are several limitations to the approach that we have undertaken. First, we were 
working off public documents.  It is possible that there is more information available 
regarding project performance in particular that we were not able to access.  Second, to 
some extent this approach is a de facto assessment of the quality of evaluation reports 
(particularly  in  relation  to  how  well/badly  they  use  evidence  to  support  their 
conclusions) rather than the actual performance of CASs and portfolios. Nevertheless, 
our analysis does raise important questions about Picciotto’s claims. Table 2 contains 




Table 2: Review of IEG project portfolio and country assistance ratings 












Morocco 1997  1983-1993  Satisfactory  Marginally 
Unsatisfactory 
Agree  
Bulgaria 2002  1991-1997  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Agree 
Costa Rica 2000  1990s  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree 
Ecuador 1999  1990s  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree 
Haiti 2002  1986-2000  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree 
Jamaica 1999  1993 CAS  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree 
Lesotho 2002  1994,1996&19
98 CASs 





1992-1994  Satisfactory  Partially 
Unsatisfactory 
Agree 
Nepal 1999  1990s  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree 
Paraguay 2001  1993  &  1997 
CASs 
Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree 
Peru 2003  1997-2000  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Agree  
Russia  2002 
(1992-98) 
1992-1998  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree  
Ukraine 1999  1992-1996  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree 
Yemen 1999  1970-1996 CAS  Satisfactory  Marginally 
Unsatisfactory 
Agree 
Zambia 2003  1996-2001  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree 
Zimbabwe 2003  1990-2000  Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree 
         
Ethiopia 1999  1990s  Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree 
Ghana 2000  1995  &  1997 
CASs 
Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree 
Russia  2002 
(1999-2001) 
1999-2001  Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Agree 
 
Note: The disagreement is with the project rating in all cases except Costa Rica.  
Source: CAEs and authors’ assessments  
Table  2  shows  ten  cases  where  the  ratings  on  project  performance  were  rated  as 
satisfactory  but  where  CAEs  themselves  provided  evidence  that,  in  our  view, 
contradicted this assessment. This evidence is summarized in Annex B. Reasons for 
disagreement with the CAE assessment includes the following (with the countries for 




  Failure to take into account the CAE’s own findings. The aggregate project ratings 
do not appear in the CAEs themselves, and do not appear to take into account 
analysis contained in the CAEs. In nearly all cases where we question the rating, 
the CAE itself makes damning statements about project performance or provides 
information  which  questions  a  rating  of  satisfactory  project  performance 
(Paraguay, Haiti, Jamaica, Zambia, Lesotho, Nepal, Ukraine, Russia, Zimbabwe). 
  Excessive reliance on performance ratings of closed projects. Completed projects 
are individually rated by the IEG, and so provide good evidence of aggregate 
project performance. As discussed earlier, these IEG ratings seem to be the basis 
of the aggregate project rating. However, the projects which close over, say, a 
five year period may not be representative of project performance over that five 
years, which will also be influenced, and probably more influenced, by new and 
ongoing projects (Paraguay).  
  Low  sustainability.  Projects  might  on  average  have  satisfactory  ratings  on 
closing,  but  if  they  have  low  sustainability  ratings,  it  is  likely  that,  when 
assessing  performance  at  a  later  date  (e.g.,  at  the  time  of  the  CAE),  their 
performance  should  be  more  harshly  judged.  Very  low  sustainability  ratings 
were taken by us as reasons for lowering aggregate project ratings (Ecuador, 
Haiti, Lesotho, Nepal, Zambia, Zimbabwe). 
  Lack of supporting evidence. In some cases, no evidence is available in the CAE to 
support the project rating (Russia, Ukraine). 
  Use of unweighted rather than weighted average. In some cases, more than 50% 
of  closed  projects  had  a  satisfactory  rating  by  number,  but  not  by  size 
(commitment). It is not clear which should be used. The CAE seems to typically 
only give weight to the former, but we took a weighted-average success rate of 
less  than  50  per  cent  as  a  good  reason  for  an  unsatisfactory  rating  overall 
(Paraguay,  Jamaica,  Ecuador),  especially  when  the  unweighted  average  was 
around 50%, as it was for these three countries, on the grounds that it matters 




The evidence summarized in Annex B appears to us to provide compelling grounds for 
disagreement. Some of the ratings we challenge seem to be simple errors. For example, 
in Russia the aggregate performance rating is satisfactory, though only 47 per cent of 
projects by number and 28 per cent by commitment obtained a satisfactory rating at 
closing. No other evidence is available in the CAE to justify this positive rating. 
Other  cases  are  more  complex,  but  no  less  compelling.  Paraguay  was  given  a 
satisfactory  project  rating  presumably  because  50  per  cent  of  projects  are  rated 
satisfactory in their ICRs. However, this is 50 per cent of only three projects,4 and with 
weighting by project size even this indicator falls t o 35 per cent. Moreover, apart from 
the three projects which closed (and therefore had ICRs) over the period of review 
(1992-1999), there were a larger number of other projects underway over the review 
period. The 2001 Paraguay CAE tells us that of the 9 o perations approved between 
1992 and 1997, at the time of writing only one had closed, and five of the remaining 
eight were problem projects. The CAE also tells us that ‘…the majority of the projects 
approved since 1992 have had serious implementation problems and poor outcomes’ 
(p.12) and that in August 1999 the Paraguay portfolio was rated among the Bank’s ten 
worst. Surely, even if one wants to emphasize the 50 per cent rating for closed projects 
(rather than the 35 per cent for the weighted average for these same projects), the poor 
performance  of  the  non-closed  projects  should  tip  the  aggregate  project  rating  to 
unsatisfactory. 
Zimbabwe  is  another  case  where  the  headline  number  is  misleading.  6  out  of 8  of 
projects approved between 1990 and 2002 had satisfactory ratings. However, the CAE 
notes  that  the  two  structural  adjustment  credits  “did  not  achieve  their  major 
objectives.”  (p.12)  If  so,  then  at  most  55  per  cent  of projects  by  volume  should  be 
regarded as satisfactory. For most of these projects (by volume and size) the rating is 
marginally satisfactory, with unclear or unlikely sustainability, suggesting that overall 
project performance could not be regarded as satisfactory. 
In some other cases, there is more room for different views, but we still think the CAE 
rating should be challenged. In the case of Nepal, 65% of completed projects were rated 
                                                 
4 It is unclear how the rating can be 50% if there are only 3 projects, but this is what is provided in the 




satisfactory and, 85% by volume. But only 16% of projects were rated sustainable, and 
27%  of  commitments  were  cancelled.  According  to  the  CAE  itself,  projects  were 
designed  without  due  consideration  to  the  policy  environment.  With  these  major 
shortcomings, an aggregate project rating of satisfactory does not seem warranted.  
We did not re-assess country ratings, except in one case, where it seemed to us that IEG 
had not followed its own methodology. In the case of Costa Rica, the CAE notes there 
was significant progress towards the objectives of the Country Assistance Strategy, and 
that the primary driver of this was the government.  The document also notes that the 
Bank’s strategy was relevant.  However it is harsh on the Bank’s judgment in relation to 
the pace of reform and indicates that inappropriate instruments were used.  This seems 
to  drive  the  unsatisfactory  CAS  performance  rating.  However,  as  per  the  IEG 
methodology,  an  unsatisfactory  CAS  performance  rating  requires  that  that  the 
assistance program did not make acceptable progress toward most of its major relevant 
objectives.    By  IEG’s  own  analysis,  this  was  not  the  case  for  Costa  Rica.  The 
unsatisfactory rating appears to us to be a rating of Bank performance rather than of 
the achievement of country assistance objectives, which, according to the IEG itself, 
should be the basis for CAS performance ratings. 
Turning to the three reverse paradox countries, for Ethiopia 1999 and Ghana 2000, 
project portfolio performance was rated as unsatisfactory, yet both these countries had 
high project ratings: unweighted average satisfactory ratings of 79 per cent and 78 per 
cent respectively, and significantly higher than average ratings.  In the case of Russia 
2002 (1999-2000), the unsatisfactory rating on project performance appears justified.  
Thus from an initial list of 19 cases of disconnect, only six stand up to scrutiny. It is 
possible  that  some  of  the  13  which  do  not  stand  up  to  scrutiny  could  be  cases  of 
disconnect, but at a minimum one should have a high level of doubt as to whether these 
are disconnect countries, and, with a lower level of confidence, one can hold that they 
are not.  
What is the reason for the paradox in the remaining six cases? There appear to be two 
main  ones.  First,  the  disconnect  is  often  caused  by  over-ambitious  CAS  objectives 
(Morocco 1997, Bulgaria 2002), often related to a poor understanding of the political 




Peru 2003).  Second, in the case of both Mexico 2001 (1992-94) (the Tequila Crisis) and 
Russia 2002 (1992-98) (the collapse of the Soviet Union and Asian Financial Crisis), 
crises led to the disconnect. In the former case, the external shock was judged to have 
prevented project level achievements from translating into country objectives. In the 
latter  case,  the  Bank’s  response  to  the  crisis  was  thought  to  have  enabled  country 
objectives to be achieved even in the face of poor project performance. 
Neither of these factors are among those which could lead to a macro-micro paradox. 5 
By definition, an external shock is a non-aid factor. Any disconnect due to an external 
shock says nothing about whether aggregate aid has an impact which differs from the 
aggregated effect of individual aid projects. Rather, the role of the shock is to break the 
link,  which  would  be  expected  under  normal  circumstances,  between  project  and 
country level performance.  
The other factor, over-ambitious objectives, is equally unconnected to the question of 
whether aid impacts the recipient economy or society other than through the impact of 
individual projects. It simply tells us that the Bank is sometimes too optimistic in what 
it expects at the country level from the achievement of its project objectives.  
5. Conclusion 
To return to Mosely’s 1986 question, in the case of Picciotto (2009) unfortunately the 
data  do  deceive.  Not  a  third,  but  only  just  over  10  per  cent  of  the  Bank  country 
evaluations  show  a  disconnect  between  aggregate  project  and  overall  performance 
when subject to scrutiny (as against the one-third before scrutiny). And none of the 
remaining cases of disconnect provide any evidence at all of a micro-macro paradox.  
Indeed  it  is  clear  after  closer  examination  that  use  of  the  particular  World  Bank 
evidence base used by Picciotto, though innovative, is unlikely to pay dividends. The 
time period is too short (if aid has negative impacts, it is likely due to the cumulative 
                                                 
5  Interestingly,  in  the  IEG’s  own  retrospective  of  CAEs,  no  attempt  is  made  to  link  the  finding  of  a 
significant disconnect to the micro-macro paradox. Using a different sample, the IEG also finds one-third 
of cases having a disconnect. It explains this by noting that “The CAE is a comprehensive evaluation of the 
Bank’s  program  in  a  country  that  comprises  both  projects  and  analytical  and  advisory  activities. 
Moreover, CAEs must make an assessment of overall Bank strategy, including size, sectoral composition, 
and type of lending. For example, the CAE outcome may be unsatisfactory if there are critical omissions in 
the Bank’s overall assistance strategy, even if the outcomes of individual projects are rated satisfactory. 




impact of aid, not just due to aid given in that period), and all aid needs to be examined, 
not just aid from one donor.  Indeed, discussion of the aggregate impact of aid and of 
possible negative effects is markedly absent from most of the CAEs.  
Does this mean that country assistance strategies and their evaluation are a waste of 
time? The appropriate level of evaluation is indeed a matter of debate. Easterly, for 
example, favours project level evaluations. What is needed, he argues, is “not overall 
sweeping evaluations of a whole nationwide development program, but specific and 
continuous evaluation of particular interventions” (2006, p. 194). But others dispute 
this.  Collier  (2002,  p.2)  argues  that:  “project-level  performance  is  an  inadequate 
instrument for attaining donor objectives,” that a project-level focus is both costly and 
ineffective, and that aid  should be assessed  by its ability to promote reform at  the 
country level.  
We  would  argue  that  country  assistance  strategies  and  their  evaluation  are  indeed 
important, even  if they are unable to establish conclusively whether a micro-macro 
paradox exists. Individual aid interventions might succeed, but they may not be the 
most  important interventions. Interventions might  succeed but  strategic  gaps might 
lead to failure at the country level. And projects might succeed better if there were 
fewer of them, in fewer sectors.  Projects might succeed, but governments might be 
nevertheless overwhelmed by them. These country-level health-checks are critical for 
effective aid delivery, but can be only carried out through some form of country-level 
evaluation. They will not emerge from intervention-level analysis.  
Country-level  assessments  also  serve  as  useful  accountability  tools  for  donors,  in 
particular forcing them to wrestle with the unfortunate reality that in many recipient 
countries projects succeed even as nations fail.  
At the same time, a number of lessons arise from the analysis of this paper with regard 
to the design of country assistance strategies and their evaluation. The first is the old 
message that strategies should adopt more realistic objectives.   
The second is that country assistance evaluations should pay more attention to possible 




any  attempt  to  examine  whether  aid  had  led  to  rent-seeking,  or  exchange  rate 
appreciation, or a heavy administrative burden, for example. 
The  third  is  that  a  more  careful  and  rigorous  methodology  is  needed  for  defining 
aggregate project performance in the context of a country assistance evaluation. In our 
view, the IEG gets over half its project ratings wrong. For the reasons discussed above, 
it does not make sense to use a mechanical rating based on the average rating of closed 
projects, as the IEG seems to. 
To close, our inability over the last quarter of a century to provide a definitive answer to 
the questions Mosely posed in 1986 raises the distinct possibility that we may never 
know whether aid does involve a macro-micro paradox. It might all be too complex for 
either cross-country regressions or a case-study approach to pick up. The systemic 
impacts of aid, to the extent they exist, are likely to accumulate slowly, over many years. 
There  is  no  clear  counter-factual.  It  is  very  hard  to  envisage  what  aid-dependent 
countries, where presumably paradox impacts are strongest, would look like in the 
absence of aid.  
Given this irreducible uncertainty, perhaps the best advice to donors is to act as if the 
paradox  is  indeed  real,  and  to  constantly  examine  and  guard  against  transmission 
mechanisms which might prevent the aggregate effect of aid for being less than the sum 
of its parts. To this end, both country assistance evaluations and in-depth country case 
studies, even if they cannot themselves shed light on whether the micro-macro paradox 




6. Annex A: List of Country Assistance Evaluations6  
Costa Rica November 16, 2000 (Report no. 21391) 
Ecuador June 4, 1999 (Report no. 21825)  
Ethiopia November 30, 2000 (Report no.21450) 
Ghana April 18, 2000 (Report no.20328) 
Haiti February 12, 2002 (Report no.23637) 
Jamaica December 21, 1998 (Report no. 19356) 
Lesotho, 2002 
Mexico June 28, 2001 (Report no. 22498) 
Morocco, 1997 (Report no. 16326) 
Nepal November 1, 1999 (Report no.19850) 
Paraguay, 2001 
Peru, September 25, 2002 (Report no. 24898) 
Republic of Bulgaria March 7, 2002 (Report no. 23809) 
Russian Federation September 23, 2002 (Report no.24875) 
Ukraine November 8, 2000 (Report no. 21358) 
Yemen, January 2001 (Report no. 21787) 
Zambia November 7, 2002 (Report no. 25075) 
Zimbabwe May 21, 2004 (Report no. 29058)
                                                 
6 With report references, where available, at 




7. Annex B: Summary Table: Reappraisal of Country Ratings 
Note: this table covers all the paradox or disconnect countries (see Table 1). 








project rating (CAS 
performance rating in 
the case of Costa Rica.) 
Project performance (weighted 
by commitments where 
available)  








Satisfactory  Agree   Outcome rating of 89 per cent (p.4). 







Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Agree  Outcome rating of 95 per cent 
(paragraph 2.16, p.7), Likely 





Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree  Outcome rating of 100 per cent 
(based on 3 projects). Likely 
sustainability 100 per cent (1 
project). (Annex A, Table 4, p.25) 
Costa Rica achieved significant progress towards the 
objectives of the Country Assistance Strategy.  The 
primary driver of this was the government (paragraph 
4.8,p.9).  Given this, the CAS should have been rated as 
moderately satisfactory or better. The CAE suggests that 
the Bank did not adequately consider timeframes for 
reform, but this is a criticism of the Bank, not an 





Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree  Outcome rating from 1991-99, 44 
per cent by commitment (50 per 
cent by volume). (Annex A, Table 
A.1, p.18). Sustainability low at 42 
per cent (paragraph 3.2, p.10). 




Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree  Satisfactory ratings for 63 per cent 
Sustainability rating of 21 per cent. 
(Annex Table 5, Table I) 
 
The evaluation report notes that projects in Haiti have 
unusually low ratings for outcome, institutional 
development and sustainability (paragraph 3.6, p.17).  
There were suspensions in lending and projects (1991-
94 and 1994-97) due to the coup and related political 
events.  The Memorandum to the Executive Directors 












project rating (CAS 
performance rating in 
the case of Costa Rica.) 
Project performance (weighted 
by commitments where 
available)  
Basis of disagreement and other notes 
 
“The efficacy of the Bank’s program has been negligible, 
and its efficiency, low. The development impact of Bank 
assistance to Haiti since 1986 has been severely limited. 
The critical constraints to development – governance 
and public sector capacity and accountability – have not 
diminished, nor have sectors registered substantial 
improvements.  Based on both its impact and the 
ratings of its individual components, the outcome of the 
assistance program is rated unsatisfactory (if not highly 




Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree  Satisfactory outcomes for 49 per 
cent of projects if weighted, 51 per 
cent if un-weighted. Likely 
sustainability of 44 per cent (Table 
7) 
 See ratings.  CAE suggests that ‘The poor performance 
of the project portfolio is attributed to overambitious 
designs that did not reflect implementation capacity’ 








Satisfactory  Disagree  Satisfactory outcomes for 67 per 
cent. Likelihood of sustainability 22 
per cent. (Table 3.4, p.22) 
The evaluation report noted that World Bank programs 
were ineffective with the exception of education. (E.S, 





Satisfactory  Agree  Satisfactory outcomes in 87 per 
cent of value by commitment. 
Likelihood of sustainability 70 per 
cent (paragraph 3.11, p.20). 
The evaluation report covers four CAS periods between 
1989 and 2000.  Of these, one period of two years was 
considered partially unsuccessful in relation to CAS 
performance.  This was primarily due to “inadequate 
attention by senior Bank managers to banking sector 
issues” (paragraph 3.4, p.16)  
Nepal 1999 
(1990s) 
Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree  Satisfactory outcomes in 82 per 
cent of projects, but sustainability 
only 16 per cent (paragraph 2.4, pp. 
2-3) 
“As a consequence of a poor enabling environment, 
Bank projects had limited impact on their broader 
objectives; suffered from a range of implementation 
problems; and there are serious doubts about their 
sustainability. Frequent changes in key decision makers 
due to political instability, inadequate management, and 
lack of counterpart funds undermined project 












project rating (CAS 
performance rating in 
the case of Costa Rica.) 
Project performance (weighted 
by commitments where 
available)  
Basis of disagreement and other notes 
 
from Director General , IEG). The report notes that 27 
per cent of original commitments were cancelled.  This 
was the highest rate in the region (paragraph 2.4. p.2). 
Also “Outcomes in most areas of Bank assistance, 
agriculture, the financial sector, power, health, 
education quality, water supply, transportation and 
public sector management were unsatisfactory” 
(paragraph 4.1, p.5). These negative comments and the 
very low sustainability ratings make the satisfactory 





Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree  Satisfactory outcomes in 35 per 
cent of net commitments, however 
this is based on only three 
evaluations between 1991 and 
1999 (Table 6, p.28) 
There were only three project evaluations over the 
relevant period. This is too small a number to draw 
conclusions that project performance was satisfactory. 
Of the 9 operations approved between 1992 and 1997, 
at the time of writing only one had closed, and five of 
the remaining eight were problem projects. The CAE 
also tells us that “the majority of the projects approved 
since 1992 have had serious implementation problems 
and poor outcomes” (paragraph 3.1, p.12) and that in 
August 1999 the Paraguay portfolio was rated among 




Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Agree   Satisfactory outcomes in 98 per 
cent (projects approved between 
1991-2002, weighted by 
commitment). Likelihood of 






Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree  Satisfactory outcomes in 28 per 
cent weighted by commitment. 
(p.13) 
Likely sustainability of 78 per cent. 
(p.14) 
“Except for sustainability though, Russia’s performance 
has been well below that of comparators as well as 
Bankwide and ECA averages” (p.14) 
The good results in sustainability cannot counter the 
poor results in outcomes.   
Ukraine 
1999 
Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree  No project ratings were presented 
in the Country Assistance 
“For the 12 ongoing projects at the end of 1998, 3 were 












project rating (CAS 
performance rating in 
the case of Costa Rica.) 
Project performance (weighted 
by commitments where 
available)  





Evaluation  and only 4 were considered "non-risky", (see Annex 5). 
The disbursement ratio is one-third of the Bank-wide 




( IDA from 







Satisfactory  Agree  Satisfactory outcomes in 81 per 
cent of projects (weighted by 
value). This is higher than the Bank 
wide average of 74 per cent. Likely 







Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree  Satisfactory outcomes for 61 per 
cent (weighted by commitment), 
and sustainability 29 per cent 
(Table 2.1, p.15)  
 
The CAE states that “Outcomes of many Bank 
operations, and of the overall program, were 
unsatisfactory” (paragraph 3.19, p. 27), which appears 
to explicitly rule out a conclusion of a disconnect. The 
introduction gives the same message: “Outcomes of the 
Bank’s program during this period are judged 
unsatisfactory, based on a “bottom-up” evaluation of the 
Bank’s products and services (Chapter II) as well as a 
“top-down” assessment of aggregate economic and 
social indicators (Chapter III).”(paragraph 1.3, p.1) Five 
structural adjustment credits made up three-quarters of 
closed commitments for the review period. Two of them 
were rated unsatisfactory. “In hindsight, even those 
adjustment operations initially rated marginally 
satisfactory have had less robust outcomes than 







Unsatisfactory  Satisfactory  Disagree  Satisfactory or moderately 
satisfactory outcomes for 81 per 
cent (weighted by net 
commitments). Sustainability 21 
per cent (p.14) 
“The continuing lack of an overall satisfactory policy 
framework which could sustain project/sector 
achievements is reflected in unsatisfactory CAE 
outcome ratings and is consistent with the poor project 
ratings on the sustainability dimension” (paragraph 
3.15, p.25)  
Two major structural adjustment credits which 












project rating (CAS 
performance rating in 
the case of Costa Rica.) 
Project performance (weighted 
by commitments where 
available)  
Basis of disagreement and other notes 
 
“did not achieve their major objectives” (paragraph 
2.22, p12), leaving at most 55 per cent of projects by 
commitment satisfactory. The bulk, by number and 
volume, has marginally (or moderately) satisfactory 






Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree  Satisfactory outcomes for 78 per 
cent (by number). Sustainability 45 
per cent. (Table 5) 
“Project performance has been average in terms of 
outcome and sustainability but above average 
concerning institutional development” (paragraph 5.1, 
p.15) . The CAE comments that “the portfolio of ongoing 
projects is rated as very satisfactory” (Memorandum 




Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Disagree  Satisfactory outcomes for 79 per 
cent (by number), and 
sustainability 53 per cent 
(paragraph 4.2, p.5). 
 
See ratings, which show strong performance compared 
to Bank wide averages. The CAE concludes that “the 
Bank’s lending and non-lending assistance have been 
well directed. (paragraph 5.1, p.15) The Bank-
supported projects have performed well by African and 
Bank standards.”(paragraph 5.5, p. 8) Although it is 
acknowledged that more needs to be done on removing 
fundamental policy and institutional constraints. 
(paragraph 5.1, p.8).  The very large ($150m) 
Emergency Recovery and Reconstruction Credit is rated 
highly satisfactory, as was the one structural 
adjustment credit for $250 m, so 86% of projects are 





Satisfactory  Unsatisfactory  Agree  Satisfactory outcomes in 28 per 
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